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Abstract
We study the effect of the Brexit referendum result on 
subjective well- being in the United Kingdom. Using a 
quasi- experimental design, we find that the referendum’s 
outcome led to an overall decrease in subjective well- being 
in the United Kingdom compared to a control group. The 
effect is driven by individuals who hold an overall posi-
tive image of the European Union and shows little signs of 
adaptation during the Brexit transition period. Economic 
expectations are potential mechanisms of this effect.
K E Y W O R D S
Brexit, election, happiness, referendum, subjective well- being
J E L  C L A S S I F I C A T I O N
D72; I30; I31; I38
1 |  INTRODUCTION
Following a relatively heated campaign leading up to a referendum with a record turnout of 72.2%, the 
United Kingdom voted in favour of leaving the European Union (EU)— also known as ‘Brexit’— on 
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23 June 2016 with a majority of 51.9% of the votes. The referendum outcome was somewhat unex-
pected as opinion polls before June 2016 tended to favour ‘Remain’. For example, YouGov polls (a 
popular opinion poll in the United Kingdom) on 25 July 2015, a year before the referendum, found 
Remain to be up 44% against Brexit 38%. This was also the case on 25 April 2016, just months before 
the referendum. This tendency for Remain was consistently reflected in betting odds as well (New 
Statesman, 2016; The Independent, 2016a; The Telegraph, 2016). Although Brexit built some mo-
mentum leading up to the referendum1, the outcome was still rather unexpected as exit- polls on refer-
endum day were estimating a victory for Remain.2
This paper studies the effects of this referendum’s result on subjective well- being— ‘experienced 
utility’ (Kahneman et al., 1997)— in the United Kingdom. Our investigation is motivated by a number 
of unique characteristics that make the effects of the EU membership referendum on subjective well- 
being worth examining.
First, the Brexit referendum result is a major policy change with potentially significant socio- 
economic implications; see, for example, Sampson (2017) and an OECD report (Kierzenkowski et al., 
2016) on the adverse economic consequences of Brexit; Dhingra et al. (2017) on the effects on trade, 
Driffield and Karoglou (2018) on inwards foreign direct investment and Breinlich et al. (2016a) and 
Breinlich et  al. (2016b) on household income and inflation, respectively. Similar views had been 
echoed by the governor of the Bank of England, warning of lower living standards, higher inflation, 
job cuts and possibly a recession as a result of leaving the EU.3 A UK government long- term analysis 
also suggested that any type of Brexit will adversely affect the economy (HM Government, 2018). 
Such economic effects have been shown to be directly related with reductions in subjective well- being 
(Boyce et al., 2013; De Neve et al., 2018; Di Tella et al., 2001; Kassenboehmer & Haisken- DeNew, 
2009; Lucas et al., 2004; Luechinger et al., 2010). It is important to note though that not all of these, 
rather gloom, economic predictions have (yet) materialised, as EU law still applies in the United 
Kingdom until the end of 2020. There is, however, little doubt that the referendum’s result led to an 
immediate devaluation of the Pound sterling, possibly due to the expected implications on trade and 
economic growth (Johnson & Mitchell, 2017), as well as unprecedented levels of economic uncer-
tainty (Bloom et al., 2018).
Second, whereas general election cycles in modern representative democracies result in parties 
often alternating in office, leaving the EU is expected to be permanent. If voters are not happy with the 
government, they can choose to vote them out of office after a term, or at least they know that there is 
an option to remove the government from power in the next election, and laws can be changed by any 
future government. However, leaving the EU cannot be reversed; or at least re- joining the EU would 
not be straightforward. There is mixed evidence in the literature on the effect of holding office or of 
elections on subjective well- being. Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) find increases in life satisfaction 
when the government is of the same ideological position as that of the respondent; Kinari et al. (2015) 
find supporters of the winning (losing) party to be significantly happier (unhappier); Pierce et  al. 
(2016) find only ‘partisan losers’ to be negatively affected; Metcalfe et  al. (2008) do not find any 
 1For example, only days before the referendum both campaigns were at 45% each according to this poll (YouGov poll, 4 July 
2016). YouGov surveys available via https://whatu kthin ks.org/eu/quest ions/if- there - was- a- refer endum - on- brita ins- membe 
rship - of- the- eu- how- would - you- vote- 2/?polls ter%5B%5D=yougov.
 2In fact, one of Brexit’s most prominent campaigners had accepted defeat as the voting was coming to a close that day (The 
Independent, 2016b).
 3See media articles, including BBC (2017a, b, c) and The Guardian (2017).
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significant effects of election results.4 Examining this referendum’s result will thus offer us a better 
understanding of the effects of (claimed) irreversible voting outcomes on subjective well- being.
Third, and related to the above, this is a single- issue referendum, rather than an election on a broad 
range of proposed policies. The literature suggests that general election outcomes tend to have a 
rather short- term effect on subjective well- being (Kinari et al., 2015; Pierce et al., 2016). It is unclear 
whether— in this setting— this is still because of some innate tendency of individuals to adapt to var-
ious unfavourable outcomes (Bradford & Dolan, 2010; Loewenstein & Ubel, 2008; Oswald & 
Powdthavee, 2008; Wilson & Gilbert, 2008), or because the policies of mainstream political parties 
gradually converge— possibly due to the Median Voter Theorem (Matsusaka, 2005).5 However, 
single- issue referenda capture only two, diametrically opposing, options with the decision- making 
process satisfied by the majority rule (May’s Theorem, 1952), so are likely to leave a significant part 
of the voting population dissatisfied. Further note that this single- issue referendum led to rather high 
levels of polarisation, and a Member of Parliament was murdered just a week before the 
referendum.
Our study further relates to the literature on the link between decision utility— or preference utility 
(Adler, 2013)— and experienced utility. The results from this literature generally point towards a con-
cordance between choices and subjective well- being which is, however, far from perfect and depends 
on the measure of subjective well- being used (Benjamin et  al., 2012, 2014; Perez- Truglia, 2015). 
Voting is arguably the most fundamental expression of an individual’s preferences in representative 
democracies, hence the study of voting outcomes and subjective well- being offers a suitable setting to 
study this relationship in larger populations.
In considering the effects of the Brexit result on subjective well- being, this study builds on the 
existing literature and makes the following contributions. First, using data from the Eurobarometer 
between 2015– 2019, we consider the referendum as the ‘event’ of a quasi- experiment and apply a 
difference- in- differences approach, to identify its effects on subjective well- being of individuals 
in the United Kingdom compared to those in a control group of other European countries, which 
are not exposed to the treatment (referendum). A previous study on the Brexit referendum result 
uses a narrower outcome measure, physician antidepressant prescriptions (Vandoros et al., 2018); 
which, as the authors acknowledge, is not as informative in determining the well- being implications 
for society as whole and does not capture any changes in mood or mental health of people who do 
not take antidepressants. There have also been reports of individuals that have been experiencing 
mental health issues following the referendum (Katshu, 2019; The Independent, 2017). In a similar 
spirit to ours, Powdthavee et al. (2019) use subjective well- being measures as the outcome, but con-
sider a UK- based control group in their difference- in- differences model. Despite the Brexit outcome 
being unexpected, the referendum itself was not an exogenous event to a UK- based control group. 
Introducing an external control group allows us to benchmark pre- and post- referendum trends in 
 4The reverse relationship (i.e. subjective well- being affecting voting intentions/election outcomes) has also been the focus of 
several studies. Using British panel data Metcalfe et al. (2008) find that more satisfied Conservative supporters are less likely 
to vote compared to Labour supporters. This is in contrast to Liberini et al. (2017) who, using the same data, find that higher 
levels of life satisfaction are an important determinant of supporting the incumbent. Ward (2019) uses Eurobarometer data to 
study over 130 parliamentary elections in 15 European countries, finding a positive association between subjective well- being 
and the vote share received by the incumbent. Herrin et al. (2018) present similar findings for the 2016 US Presidential 
election. Liberini et al. (2019) study the effect of subjective well- being on stated preferences for Brexit, finding that 
dissatisfaction with one’s financial situation, not life in general, to be an important determinant.
 5Also referred to as Hotelling’s principle of minimal differentiation.
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subjective well- being in the United Kingdom against pooled pre- and post- referendum trends in 
other countries.
Second, we use a question on respondents’ image of the EU to contemporaneously estimate het-
erogeneous effects of the referendum’s result and also estimate how individuals’ subjective well- 
being adapts depending on their image of the EU. Powdthavee et  al. (2019) split their sample in 
control and treatment groups based on individuals’ stated preference for Brexit in the second of their 
two- wave panel; thus, making the implicit assumption that respondents do not exhibit preference re-
versals between waves. Democracy, however, revolves around the transformation of peoples’ voting 
preferences. Thus, to the extent that the unobserved (former wave) preferences for Brexit might have 
been different to those observed in the latter wave, this may have implications for their difference- in- 
differences estimates.
Third, following the related literature (e.g. Gerber & Huber, 2010) we consider economic 
expectations— both for the respondents’ household (egotropic) and for the country as a whole 
(sociotropic)— for each group of respondents based on their image of the EU as potential mechanisms 
of the subjective well- being- Brexit relationship.
Our main finding is that the Brexit vote led to an overall decrease in subjective well- being in the 
United Kingdom, with little signs of adaptation within the span of our sample. The effect is mostly 
driven by individuals who hold an overall positive image of the EU. Economic expectations, espe-
cially the ones about the national economy, are potential drivers of this effect.
2 |  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
To investigate the effect of the 2016 EU referendum on subjective well- being we use data from 
the Eurobarometer Survey Series, the European Commission’s public opinion survey. This is a 
cross- sectional face- to- face survey of individuals in EU member states conducted usually twice 
a year (spring and autumn) since the 1970s. About 1,000 respondents are interviewed in each 
country- wave on a range of topics including their satisfaction with life given by the question on the 
whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life 
you lead?. Such measures are increasingly being used in academic and policy circles to evaluate 
policy, intangibles and non- market goods; see for example, van Praag and Baarsma (2005), Dolan 
and Kahenman (2008), Luechinger and Raschky (2009), Metcalfe et al. (2011), Levinson (2012), 
and Dolan et al. (2019), as well as HM Treasury (2011), OECD (2013), and National Research 
Council (2013).
The empirical approach involves the estimation of a difference- in- differences (DiD) model, 
essentially comparing treatment and control groups before and after the intervention. This spec-
ification requires an appropriate control group, following the same trend as the treatment group 
(the United Kingdom) prior to the intervention (Brexit referendum) and not affected by the inter-
vention itself. Challenged by a natural quasi- experimental design, we proceed by considering an 
objective measure developed by the IMF (Chen et al., 2018b) to determine each of the remaining 
27 EU country’s relationship to the United Kingdom.6 This measure accounts for trade, financial 
linkages and migration. We subsequently split the EU 27 countries into quartile groups, from 
least linked (bottom quartile, Q1) to highly linked to the United Kingdom (upper quartile, Q4), 
and consider the bottom quartile, Q1, as the control group. This is justified under the assumption 
 6This objective measure in determining the control group further reduces experimenter bias, such as determining some 
subjective criteria for countries to be included in the control group.
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that countries within Q1 (including Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Poland, Romania and 
Slovenia) are the least likely to be affected by the outcome of the Brexit referendum; thus satis-
fying the stable unit treatment assumption, ruling out spillover effects to the group of untreated 
countries.7
This approach in determining the control group shares similarities with Ahlfeldt and Kavetsos 
(2014) who, in estimating the impact of regional interventions on property prices, consider the outer— 
more distant— properties from the intervention as the appropriate control group. In our study, note that 
‘distance’ is a comprehensive measure of trade, financial linkages and migration, incorporated in the 
IMF’s measure. Nonetheless, these seven countries within Q1 are also geographically distant from the 
United Kingdom, which is an intuitively appealing property as well.
We use data spanning over the period 2015– 2019, which includes waves 83.1 (Feb– Mar 2015), 
83.3 (May 2015), 83.4 (May– June 2015), 84.3 (Nov 2015), 85.1 (Apr 2016), 85.2 (May 2016) and 
85.3 (June 2016) before the referendum; and waves 86.1 (Sep– Oct 2016), 86.2 (Nov 2016), 86.3 
(Nov– Dec 2016), 87.1 (Mar 2017), 87.3 (May 2017), 88.1 (Sep– Oct 2017), 88.2 (Oct 2017), 88.3 
(Nov 2017), 89.1 (Mar 2018), 89.2 (Apr 2018), 89.3 (Jun 2018), 90.1 (Sep 2018), 90.2 (Oct 2018), 
90.3 (Nov 2018), 90.4 (Dec 2018), 91.1 (Feb 2019) and 91.2 (Mar 2019) after the referendum. Our 
baseline specification is given by Equation (1): 
where SWB is the subjective well- being of respondent i at country c, interviewed in month m and year t; 
UK is a time- invariant dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is interviewed in the United Kingdom 
and zero otherwise; PostBrexit is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is interviewed after the 
Brexit referendum result; X is a vector of individual characteristics/observables; c is the country fixed 
effect; m is the month of interview fixed effect; and t is the year of interview fixed effect.
8
In particular, vector X includes the following individual observables: gender, marital status, age and 
age squared, type of community, education, occupation and number of children aged under 14.9 Note that 
we do not control for macroeconomic conditions, including GDP per capita, the unemployment rate and 
inflation rate. As these are likely to be affected by the outcome of interest (Johnson & Mitchell, 2017), 
they can be viewed as ‘bad controls’ (Angrist & Pischke, 2009), thus justifying their exclusion from the 
model. Robust standard errors clustered at the country- wave level are reported throughout.
Despite the dependent variable being ordinary, we estimate Equation (1) using OLS (see Ferrer- 
i- Carbonell & Frijters, 2004, for a discussion in this context); but also report estimates based on an 
ordered logit model.
We next test for heterogeneous effects of the referendum’s outcome on UK respondents. In the 
absence of a Brexit- specific question in a cross- country dataset such as the Eurobarometer, we use 
a proxy variable to capture respondents’ attitude towards the EU instead. This is not necessarily a 
 7Q2 includes France, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain; Q3 includes the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Latvia and Sweden; and Q4, the group of countries mostly related to the United Kingdom 






 8We do not control for day of week fixed effects due to data unavailability in some waves. Our results are, however, robust to 
the exclusion of these waves and the introduction of day- of- the- week fixed effects.
 9Note that as of 2004 the Eurobarometer does not include a question on income. This is not necessarily a limitation of this 
study as income could be directly affected by the outcome of the vote and thus constitute a ‘bad control’ in the regression 
models (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).
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limitation. Given the heated campaign leading up to this vote, as well as the ongoing equally heated 
debate on this matter, focusing on a Brexit- specific question could possibly make some respondents 
reluctant to reveal their true preference and/or sentiments towards the matter (Berinsky, 1999) and 
avoid being labelled as a ‘Brexiter’ or a ‘Remainer’. A question on wider attitudes towards the EU 
might, thus, be considered to be appropriate.
There is considerable work in the related literature suggesting that attitudes towards the EU are 
multidimensional (see, e.g. Boomgaarden et  al., 2011; Goldberg & de Vreese, 2018; Hobolt & 
Brouard, 2011). In the absence of such specific measures we consider a general one based on the 
image the respondent holds for the EU: In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, 
fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?, included in every wave in our sam-
ple.10 We assume it is unlikely for a respondent in the United Kingdom with a broadly positive EU 
image to have a preference for Brexit, and for a respondent with a broadly negative EU image to have 
a preference for Remain. We use the response categories to split the UK sample in sub- groups, each 
of which are then interacted with the post- treatment indicator to test for heterogeneous effects. This 
specification is given in Equation (2): 
Using the calendar dimension of the survey waves following the Brexit result, we next test for 
adaptation. As discussed, this is an important motivation of this study, due to this vote being based 
on a single- issue referendum with non- reversible and non- trivial implications. Due to the calendar 
proximity between, and sometimes overlap of, survey waves we pool waves together into seasons of 
the year— spring and autumn— and estimate the following model: 
where Autumn2016 is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual is interviewed after the referendum 
and during autumn 2016 (wave 86); and similarly for Spring2017 (wave 87), Autumn2017 (wave 88), 
Spring2018 (wave 89), Autumn2018 (wave 90) and Spring2019 (wave 91).
 10Note that when referring to any evidence based on ‘attitudes’ in this paper, we are referring to this specific measure studied 
here. Another candidate measure is one of EU identity you feel you are a citizen of the EU: yes, definitely; yes, to some 
extent; no, not really; no, definitely not. As mentioned, this captures only a particular dimension of attitudes towards the EU 
and results based on this measure cannot be generalised across attitudes (correlation coefficient with EU image measure is 
0.49). Furthermore, this question is not available in every survey leading, decreasing our sample size by more than 55%. 
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3 |  RESULTS
3.1 | Graphical evidence
In Figure 1 we graph average subjective well- being for the United Kingdom and for the control group 
over the span of our sample. The vertical line separates the plot in the pre- and post- referendum peri-
ods. Treatment and control appear to follow the same trend before the referendum, satisfying the pre- 
trend assumptions for a DiD model; we discuss this more in Section 3.3 below where we offer formal 
F I G U R E  1  Average subjective well- being, UK (top) and EU (bottom)
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tests for this assumption. The United Kingdom and control group trends clearly move in opposite 
directions following the referendum, with that of the United Kingdom clearly decreasing.
3.2 | Regression results
Table 1, columns 1 and 2, present the baseline regression estimates for Equation (1), where we ini-
tially estimate our model without the inclusion of individual characteristics.11 Compared to the pre- 
Brexit period, subjective well- being in the United Kingdom decreases significantly post- Brexit by 
0.06 points (column 1), with a marginal difference (0.061 points, column 2) once individual charac-
teristics are considered. The estimated coefficients of an ordered logit model offer consistent results 
(columns 3– 4).
Table 2 presents heterogeneous estimates based on UK respondents’ image of the EU given by 
Equation (2). These suggest that the overall decrease in subjective well- being in the United Kingdom 
stems from those with generally positive attitudes towards the EU (positive and very positive catego-
ries), as well as those with neutral attitudes. In fact, the effect is larger (in absolute terms) the more 
positive these one’s EU image is. In contrast, we do not find significant differences in subjective well- 
being post- Brexit vote for those with a generally negative EU image. Results are consistent in the OLS 
and the ordered logit models.
Table 3 presents the results for adaptation to the Brexit vote. For the UK sample as a whole the 
estimates suggest there are no significant effects in overall life satisfaction in autumn 2016 (the wave 
following the referendum) with significant reductions in all waves thereafter. The estimates are more 
pronounced the further away we move from the referendum, with the interaction effects associated 
 11As noted, our regression models exclude macroeconomic variables. Including these does not change the magnitude and 
statistical significance of the main coefficient of interest.
T A B L E  1  Brexit result and subjective well- being
OLS Ologit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UK × Post Brexit −0.06*** −0.061*** −0.183*** −0.203***
(0.02) (0.019) (0.058) (0.056)
UK 0.582*** 0.601*** 1.798*** 1.935***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.06) (0.06)
Post Brexit 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.008
(0.023) (0.023) (0.061) (0.064)
Individual Characteristics No Yes No Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
(pseudo) R2 0.22 0.273 0.108 0.137
N 191,236 186,788 191,236 186,788
Notes: Regressions in columns 1– 2 are OLS based on Equation (1) without and with individual characteristics; columns 3– 4 are the 
equivalent ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the country- wave level reported in parentheses.
***p<0.01
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with spring and autumn 2018 being about twice as large as compared to those of spring and autumn 
2017. These results, thus, do not offer evidence of adaptation in subjective well- being within the span 
of the sample.
We re- estimate this model by considering heterogeneous effects based on ‘EU image’ and plot the 
estimated coefficients (along with the 95% and 99% confidence intervals) in Figure 2; estimates are 
reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. The effect of the Brexit vote is generally more pronounced for 
those with overall positive (very positive and positive categories) and neutral image of the EU. For 
those with a relatively negative EU image, we generally do not find statistically significant effects. 
T A B L E  2  Subjective well- being heterogeneous effects
OLS Ologit
(1) (2)
UK Very Positive × Post Brexit −0.101*** −0.377***
(0.038) (0.137)
UK Positive × Post Brexit −0.082*** −0.276***
(0.026) (0.079)
UK Neutral × Post Brexit −0.076 −0.256***
(0.027) (0.084)
UK Negative × Post Brexit −0.032 −0.084
(0.027) (0.088)
UK Very Negative × Post Brexit −0.027 −0.132
(0.044) (0.142)
UK Very Positive 0.238*** 0.942***
(0.048) (0.171)
UK Positive 0.119*** 0.443***
(0.039) (0.131)
UK Neutral 0.093** 0.334**
(0.041) (0.14)
UK Negative 0.071 0.246
(0.043) (0.149)
UK Very Negative 0.11** 0.051**
(0.05) (0.168)
Post Brexit 0.004 0.013
(0.023) (0.064)
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
Month/Year FE Yes Yes
(pseudo) R2 0.272 0.137
N 184,354 184,354
Notes: Regressions based on Equation (2) (column1 is OLS; column 2 is the equivalent ordered logit regression). Robust standard 
errors clustered at the country- wave level reported in parentheses.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05
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Overall, the lack of positively significant estimates for ‘partisan winners’— that is, those with relative 
negative attitudes in this case— is also documented in Pierce et al. (2016), who find only ‘partisan 
losers’ to be negatively affected, arguably due to the asymmetric impact losses have on subjective 
well- being as compared to gains (Boyce et al., 2013; De Neve et al., 2018).
T A B L E  3  Adaptation
OLS Ologit
(1) (2)
UK × Autumn 2016 −0.008 −0.032
(0.032) (0.101)
UK × Spring 2017 −0.048** −0.159***
(0.02) (0.054)
UK × Autumn 2017 −0.044** −0.135**
(0.021) (0.059)
UK × Spring 2018 −0.101*** −0.323***
(0.029) (0.093)
UK × Autumn 2018 −0.104*** −0.355***
(0.023) (0.069)




Autumn 2016 −0.004 −0.006
(0.033) (0.091)
Spring 2017 0.075*** 0.205***
(0.018) (0.049)
Autumn 2017 0.08*** 0.235***
(0.029) (0.08)
Spring 2018 0.041** 0.11**
(0.018) (0.051)
Autumn 2018 0.04 0.12
(0.025) (0.071)
Spring 2019 0.048 0.145
(0.028) (0.075)
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
Month/Year FE Yes Yes
(pseudo) R2 0.273 0.137
N 186,788 186,788
Notes: Column 1 is OLS based on Equation (3). Columns 2 is the equivalent ordered logit model. Robust standard errors clustered at 
the country- wave level reported in parentheses.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05.
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3.3 | Threats to identification
3.3.1 | Pre- referendum trends
The pre- intervention common trend between treatment and control is a key identifying assumption 
for the DiD model. For the pre- referendum period, Figure 1 offers some prima facie evidence of 
similar trends between subjective well- being in the United Kingdom and that of the group of control 
countries. We complement the graphical evidence by estimating a time- varying model similar to that 
of Autor (2003) and Ahlfeldt and Kavetsos (2014), with lags and leads associated with the treated 
group (i.e. the United Kingdom). Note that the leads of this model are the equivalent of our adapta-
tion model given by Equation (3); and thus, to put it in different words, the lags are a model similar to 
Equation (3) where the pre- referendum periods are equally broken down into spring/autumn anticipa-
tory waves. For the pre- referendum parallel trends assumption to hold, all lagged coefficients should 
be statistically insignificant. This is indeed the case for the coefficients of the lagged/anticipatory 
interaction terms for both the OLS and ordered logit model presented in Table 4. Note that the purpose 
of this exercise is not to focus on the lead estimates— which is the purpose of Equation (3), Table 3— 
yet note that the lead estimates are similar to those of our adaptation estimates, with any differences 
in statistical significance attributed to the change in the reference group associated with this model.
We extend the evidence above by performing additional tests for the common trend assumption 
between control and treatment groups for the pre- referendum data. To this end, we estimate three 
Equation (1)- type models between the following waves: ‘Spring 2015 and Autumn 2015 pooled vs. 
F I G U R E  2  Heterogeneous effects following the referendum Notes: Diamonds represent OLS estimated 
coefficients. Thick lines either side of them represent the 99% confidence interval; thin lines either side of them 
represent the 95% confidence interval [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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UK × Autumn 2015 0.028 0.053
(0.032) (0.088)
UK × Spring 2016 0.014 0.057
(0.032) (0.089)
Leads:
UK × Autumn 2016 0.002 0.001
(0.036) (0.11)
UK × Spring 2017 −0.038 −0.127
(0.026) (0.069)
UK × Autumn 2017 −0.034 −0.103
(0.027) (0.073)
UK × Spring 2018 −0.091*** −0.291***
(0.034) (0.102)
UK × Autumn 2018 −0.094*** −0.323***
(0.029) (0.081)




Autumn 2015 0.033 0.113
(0.04) (0.111)
Spring 2016 0.03 0.085
(0.024) (0.063)
Autumn 2016 0.063** 0.204**
(0.031) (0.085)
Spring 2017 0.073*** 0.20***
(0.018) (0.05)
Autumn 2017 0.116*** 0.352***
(0.035) (0.097)
Spring 2018 0.04** 0.105**
(0.019) (0.052)
Autumn 2018 0.076** 0.237***
(0.032) (0.089)
Spring 2019 0.046 0.14
(0.028) (0.076)
(Continues)
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Spring 2016’ (83 and 84 vs. 85); ‘Spring 2015 vs. Autumn 2015 and Spring 2016 pooled’ (83 vs. 84 
and 85); and finally ‘Spring 2015 vs. Spring 2016’ (83 vs. 85). Compared to the results of Table 4, this 
exercise essentially exhausts all remaining combinations for the comparison of pre- referendum survey 
waves. Estimates for all interaction terms reported in Table 5 are statistically insignificant for both the 
OLS and ordered logit model, further strengthening the common trend identifying assumption.
There are, of course, inevitable limitations of data of this sort. The pre- treatment parallel trend assump-
tion— a key identifying assumption of the DiD approach— is evidently not going to hold for an infinite num-
ber of time periods prior to the intervention. In this study, our pre- treatment period does not extend prior to 
2015. Doing so would violate the parallel trend assumption between the treatment and control groups. In 
other words, adding more waves before 2015 would prevent us from having a valid counterfactual. As with 
any quasi- experimental study satisfying the parallel trend assumption, this would only be considered as a 
limitation if diverging trends in life satisfaction prior to 2015 reoccur in the post- treatment period due to some 
unobservable factor that is unrelated to the treatment. If that were the case, it would have implications for our 
identifying strategy and would, thus, render our control group unsuitable. This possibility has implications for 
our ’adaptation’ estimates presented in Table 3, making one more inclined to rely on inferences for periods 
relatively closer to the intervention for which the counterfactual is more likely to be valid.
3.3.2 | Control group
As discussed in Section 2, our control group consists of countries in the lowest quartile of the distri-
bution of a measure of socio- economic linkage to the United Kingdom calculated by the IMF (Chen 
et al., 2018b). Although the set of countries within this lowest quartile satisfying the pre- intervention 
common trend requirement for a DiD estimation, the question that remains is: how robust is this cat-
egorisation of countries within the lowest quartile as compared to other possible measures?
Our review of the literature in this area identified two additional measures that could be used in-
stead. The first is described in Chen et al. (2018a), who develop a measure only based on trade links 
between the United Kingdom and other EU countries; the second is adopted by Dhingra et al. (2017) 
who, in addition to trade links, also account for fiscal transfers. The latter additionally consider the ef-
fects of a ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Brexit, a terminology used to determine the success of the exit negotiations 
between the United Kingdom and the EU.
Our preference for the IMF measure in determining the control group for our analysis results from 
two considerations: (a) it is a measure accounting for trade, financial linkages and migration; and 
OLS Ologit
(1) (2)
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
Month/Year FE Yes Yes
(pseudo) R2 0.273 0.137
N 186,788 186,788




720 |   KAVETSOS ET Al.
(b) offers data for all EU countries included in the Eurobarometer sample. Thus, it overall offers a 
more comprehensive measure both in terms of cross- country ‘linkage’ and data inclusiveness. Indeed, 
despite the very strong correlation between the measures (correlation coefficient between IMF and 
Chen et al. (2018a) is 0.865; and with Dhingra et al. (2017) under soft/hard Brexit is 0.987/0.99), Chen 
et al.’s (2018a) does not include Croatia, whereas Dhingra et al.’s (2017) does not include Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta.
Table 6 lists the countries included in each measure, split into quartile groups based on the dis-
tribution of each measure: from least linked (bottom quartile, Q1) to most linked (upper quartile, 
Q4). Although the quartile split of countries by measure may varies, the objective of this exercise is 
to compare those within the least linked group, Q1. Of the IMF’s seven countries in Q1 listed in the 
final column, three (Greece, Romania and Slovenia) are in the Q1 of the other measures. Bulgaria is 
not included in the Dhingra et al. sample, making it another common measure between Chen et al. 
and the IMF measure. Croatia, included in the IMF’s analysis, is not part of the analysis of any of the 
other two measures. This leaves us with Austria and Poland for the IMF’s Q1: of which, Austria enters 
Q2 and Poland enters Q3 for both the other measures. Placing the focus on Chen et al.’s and Dhingra 
et al.’s list of Q1 countries, the differences with the IMF arise in the inclusion of Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and Cyprus in some of the former measures. Italy, Spain and Portugal enter Q2 for the IMF measure. 
Cyprus is the most notable quartile switch— from Q1 based on a trade measure (Chen et al. (2018a) to 
Q4 in the IMF measure— which might be not as surprising given the cultural links between the United 
Kingdom and Cyprus arguably incorporated through the migration aspect of the IMF measure.
In addition to the above arguments, we proceed by estimating our baseline specification (Equation 
1) with respect to the lowest quartile group of countries for each of the other measures. The Table 
1, ‘column 2- equivalent’ estimates for the main coefficient of interest are: −0.072 (p<0.01, st.er-
ror=0.02) for Chen et al. (2018a), and −0.061 (p<0.01, st.error=0.021) for both scenarios in Dhingra 
et al. (2017). The latter are precisely the same estimates as those in Table 1, column 2, confirming 
T A B L E  5  Pre- referendum common trends
Waves:
OLS Ologit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(83 & 84) 
vs. 85
83 vs. 
(84 & 85) 83 vs. 85
(83 & 84) 
vs. 85
83 vs. 
(84 & 85) 83 vs. 85
UK × Post 0.007 0.017 0.014 0.046 0.054 0.056
(0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.072) (0.074) (0.081)
UK 0.542*** 0.536*** 0.541*** 1.705*** 1.693*** 1.718***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.063) (0.073) (0.072)
Post 0.031 −0.008 0.03 0.085 −0.01 0.083
(0.024) (0.029) (0.024) (0.06) (0.077) (0.06)
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(pseudo) R2 0.276 0.276 0.274 0.137 0.137 0.136
N 57,081 57,081 49,039 57,081 57,081 49,039
Notes: Columns 1– 3 are OLS; Columns 4– 6 are ordered logit. Robust standard errors clustered at the country- wave level reported in 
parentheses.
***p<0.01
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the closer correlation between the IMF and Dhingra et al. (2017), both being more comprehensive 
measures as compared to Chen et al.
3.3.3 | Placebo outcomes
Finally, we repeat the estimation of our main specification by also considering placebo outcomes; that 
is, outcomes for which we do not have any prior to believe the Brexit result would have an effect upon. 
T A B L E  6  Exposure measures— quartiles
Chen et al. (2018a) Dhingra et al. (2017) IMF
Soft Brexit Hard Brexit (Chen et al., 2018b)
Quartile
Q1 Bulgaria Greece Greece Austria
Cyprus Italy Italy Bulgaria
Greece Romania Romania Croatia
Italy Slovenia Slovenia Greece
Portugal Spain Spain Poland
Romania Romania
Slovenia Slovenia
Q2 Austria Austria Austria France
Estonia Finland Finland Italy
Finland France France Lithuania
Latvia Portugal Portugal Luxembourg
Lithuania Slovakia Slovakia Portugal
Spain Slovakia
Spain
Q3 Czech Rep. Czech Rep. Czech Rep. Czech Rep.
Denmark Germany Denmark Estonia
Hungary Hungary Germany Finland
Luxembourg Poland Poland Germany
Poland Sweden Sweden Hungary
Slovakia Latvia
Sweden Sweden
Q4 Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium
France Denmark Hungary Cyprus
Germany Ireland Ireland Denmark
Ireland Netherlands Netherlands Ireland
Malta Malta
Netherlands Netherlands
Notes: Chen et al.’s (2018a) measure includes 26 countries within our sample (except Croatia); Dhingra et al. (2017) includes 19 
countries (except: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta); IMF’s (Chen et al., 2018b) includes all 
27 countries in our sample. Countries in bold fonts appear consistently in the same distributional quartile across measures.
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The quest for such an outcome within our data is far from trivial, especially when considering the 
impact Brexit will have in UK policy- making; recall that the Eurobarometer is the EU Commission’s 
public opinion poll. Also note that, irrespective of outcome, this latter still has to satisfy DiD’s pre- 
intervention common trend assumption.
We initially considered a handful of outcomes, including whether individuals consider crime; 
terrorism; the environment, climate and energy issues; education; and pensions, respectively, to be 
an important issue in their country. Of these, only education satisfied the DiD common trend as-
sumption. Given the binary outcome of this variable, we estimate Equation (1) using a logit model, 
yielding a statistically insignificant estimate for the main coefficient of interest (UKxPost=−0.088, 
st.error=0.075), offering further reassurance that the effects of the Brexit result on subjective well- 
being are not spurious. Given the availability of this outcome in those specific waves, we estimate 
a subjective well- being regression over that same sample for comparison purposes. Also, for direct 
comparison to the binary placebo regression, we create a binary life satisfaction variable by merging 
the relatively positive and negative life satisfaction response categories, respectively, and estimate a 
logit model. The estimate of the treatment effect is −0.17 (p<0.01, st.error=0.068). Estimates are 
equally statistically significant if we use life satisfaction’s four- scale response category.
Finally, we estimate Equation (1) with the EU image measure as the dependent variable. Our aim 
here is not to treat this measure as a placebo outcome per se, rather to test whether this attitude changes 
because of the referendum’s outcome, thus having implications for our DiD estimates. The results 
of this regression— for which the identifying assumption of common pre- referendum trend holds— 
are reported in Table A2 in the appendix. The coefficient of the interaction variable is statistically 
insignificant in all models implying that EU image is not significantly affected by the referendum’s 
outcome.
4 |  MECHANISMS
The purpose of this section is to consider plausible mechanisms explaining the estimated reduction in 
subjective well- being in the United Kingdom following the referendum. To this aim, we consider UK 
respondents’ expectations for the next 12 months for (a) the financial situation of their household (ego-
tropic belief) and (b) the economic situation of the country (sociotropic belief).12 The related literature 
suggests that election outcomes determine such beliefs (e.g. Anderson et al., 2004; Glasgow & Weber, 
2005; Gerber & Huber, 2010). Response categories to both questions are: better; worse; the same.
As the negative effect of the Brexit vote on subjective well- being seems to be driven by those with an 
overall positive or neutral image of the EU (see Table 2), we calculate the percentages for the better and 
worse response categories over time by respondents’ attitude towards the EU and plot these in Figure 3. 
For a more informative picture, we merge the very positive and positive EU image categories, and simi-
larly for the very negative and negative categories. For the case of expectations, we omit the same response 
category for two reasons: First, to de- clutter the graphs, as the sum of percentages amongst the three re-
sponse categories adds up to 100 (the excluded category can, thus, be calculated); and second, given the 
pooled cross- sectional data the interpretation of the same is not trivially interpreted. Finally, our data stops 
in Autumn 2018 as expectations were not included in Spring 2019 surveys.
For the case of egotropic expectations (Figure 3, top row), the percentage of the sample for those 
with a positive EU image expecting their household finances to become worse was rather stable pre- 
referendum at around 5.5%; this tends to triple post- referendum. The opposite is true for those with 
 12Included in waves 81.2, 81.4, 82.3, 83.3, 84.3, 85.2, 86.2, 87.3, 88.3, 89.1 and 90.3.
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F I G U R E  3  Egotropic (top row) and sociotropic (bottom row) economic expectations
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positive expectations. A similar pattern is observed for those with a neutral EU image, although the 
changes in proportions here are not as large. For those with a negative EU image, there are some 
specific waves where the proportions might change (such as a large drop for those with positive ex-
pectations in Spring 2018, perhaps due to some uncertainty with the course of Brexit), but the overall 
trend in both lines is rather flat.
For the case of sociotropic expectations (Figure 3, bottom row), we observe more prominent 
changes. Considering the case of those with a positive EU image, the proportion of those with nega-
tive economic beliefs jumps up from around 18% pre- referendum to 50% post- referendum; reaching 
60% in the final wave. We observe a similar change in proportions for those with a neutral EU image, 
which is again of a slightly smaller scale (from around 18% pre- referendum to around 35% post- 
referendum). For the case of those with a negative EU image we observe that the proportion of those 
expecting the economy to do better in the next 12 months decreases pre- referendum, but increases 
post- referendum: an expected result given their attitude for the EU. There is again a drop in autumn 
2017, which might be due to the uncertainty surrounded with Brexit and the negotiations around the 
withdrawal agreement. At the same time, however, the proportion of those with a negative expectation 
also increases post- referendum. So these beliefs broadly appear to be cancelling each- other out.
The combined evidence in Figure 3 thus supports our earlier estimates finding significant reduc-
tions in subjective well- being for those with a positive and neutral EU attitude, but not for those with 
negative EU attitude. Our results are in line with Sorace & Hobolt, (forthcoming) who show increased 
pessimism about the economy shared amongst Remain voters.
5 |  DISCUSSION
Over recent decades there has been considerable interest in reports of subjective well- being as a meas-
ure of individuals’ experienced utility. Whereas more direct democracy leads to higher levels of sub-
jective well- being (Frey & Stutzer, 2000), the evidence of the effect of such voting outcomes on 
subjective well- being is scarce. This paper studies the effect of the Brexit referendum result on subjec-
tive well- being. The rather unexpected result of this referendum is worth examining for at least three 
reasons. First, it has already had an adverse effect in the UK economy (Johnson & Mitchell, 2017), 
with future projections not being very positive13; second, it is a permanent decision, which has impli-
cations for the degree of adaptation to this outcome; and third, it was a single- issue referendum.
Using data from the Eurobarometer between 2015– 2019 and applying a quasi- experimental de-
sign, we find that life satisfaction post- referendum significantly decreased in the United Kingdom as a 
whole as compared to a control group consisting of other EU countries. This estimate is not negligible; 
to put it in the context of subjective well- being magnitudes we look at relative effects with respect to 
other determinants. Based on this exercise, our estimate of the referendum’s result on subjective well- 
being (−0.061 from Table 1, column 2) is just as large as the coefficient of being widowed (−0.063) 
and about 1/3 of that of being unemployed (−0.199). The latter tends to have one of the largest ad-
verse effects on subjective well- being, to which individuals do not seem to adapt to (see e.g. Knabe 
& Rätzel, 2011; Lucas et al., 2004) and thus offers a more reliable comparison for the purposes of 
estimating relative effects. We do not find evidence of adaptation to the referendum’s outcome, at least 
not within the span of our sample focusing on the Brexit transition period.
 13See, for example, the Bank of England’s (2018) report commissioned by the House of Commons Treasury Committee and a 
recent analysis by the UK’s HM Government (2018), both issued in November 2018.
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Estimating heterogeneous effects of the Brexit result based on individuals’ image of the EU sug-
gests that those with an overall positive image report significantly lower levels of subjective well- 
being; with the effect being more pronounced the more positive one’s image of the EU is. Under the 
assumption that individuals with an overall positive image towards the EU do not have a preference for 
Brexit, then these estimates are perhaps not as surprising. More importantly, and in contrast to other 
studies in the literature that find a rather fast adaptation process to voting outcomes (Kinari et al., 
2015; Pierce et al., 2016; Powdthavee et al., 2019), we do not generally find the levels of subjective 
well- being to adapt within our sample’s time span.
In addition to preferences not being met, this finding might to some extent reflect the affective 
reaction and the uncertainty during the transition period to exit the EU. First, individuals tend to have 
a greater affective reaction to unexpected events and to novel, as compared to recurrent, events (Wilson 
& Gilbert, 2008); the Brexit result is an example of both of these points. Second, uncertainty has a 
detrimental effect on economic activity (Born & Pfeifer, 2014; Fernández- Villaverde et  al., 
2015)— especially during times of political uncertainty (Julio & Yook, 2012)— and tends to rise 
during a recession and/or after a significant shock in the economy (Bloom, 2014). Uncertainty affects 
peoples’ mood by preventing hedonic adaptation (e.g. people adapt faster to the certainty of an adverse 
health state than facing the uncertainty of being or not being in such a state: Frederick & Loewenstein, 
1999), and has been shown to even lead to suicide (Vandoros et al., 2019). ‘Policy uncertainty indices’, 
based on media reports, suggest that uncertainty negatively affects investment and consumption 
(Baker et al., 2016). Such an index rose to unprecedented levels in the United Kingdom following the 
Brexit vote, above the levels reached during the recent financial crisis (Bloom et al., 2018). The mul-
tifaceted implications on Brexit (e.g. related to regulation, access to the EU market, etc), alongside the 
complex and long exit negotiation period between the United Kingdom and the EU, arguably ampli-
fies uncertainty.14 Using data from the Decision Maker Panel— a representative survey of businesses 
in the United Kingdom— Bloom et al. (2018) find that about 40% of UK businesses face Brexit- related 
uncertainty.
Our results for those with an overall negative EU image do not support the reverse: corresponding 
estimates of subjective well- being are not statistically different compared to the control group. To 
this extent, our findings are similar to Pierce et al. (2016) who for the 2012 US Presidential election 
find the subjective well- being of ‘partisan losers’ (Republicans) to be negatively affected following 
the election, but that of ‘partisan winners’ (Democrats) remaining unaffected. Some coefficients are 
seldomly negative and significant, perhaps reflecting some sort of a distress or unmet expectations 
following the evolving exit negotiations and perhaps even a kind of dissatisfaction from deviating 
away from a ‘hard(er) Brexit’.
This study took a leap into considering plausible mechanisms of the subjective well- being- Brexit 
effects. To this end, we consider both egotropic and sociotropic expectations of finances and the econ-
omy, respectively. This analysis indicates that those with a positive and neutral image of the EU are 
consumed by negative economic expectations, and especially so for the sociotropic domain.
 14Note that Theresa May, the UK Prime Minister between July 2016– July 2019, had to deal with several ministerial 
resignations in her cabinet and faced herself a no- confidence vote by members of the Conservative Parliamentary party in 
December 2018, followed by a motion of no- confidence in the House of Commons in January 2019. She survived both votes 
but was eventually forced to resign in June 2019 as her EU withdrawal agreement had failed to receive a majority of votes in 
three successive occasions. The United Kingdom went through snap elections in June 2017 under Theresa May’s Premiership 
(2 years after the previously held general elections of May 2015) and again in December 2019 following Parliamentary 
deadlock over Brexit under Boris Johnson’s Premiership.
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This study, like any other, is not free of limitations. The Eurobarometer data we use are being 
broadly conducted in the spring and autumn of every year. With the EU membership referendum 
taking place in July 2016, we do not estimate the immediate aftermath of the Brexit result on subjec-
tive well- being; including its effect on heterogeneous sub- groups. Further note that we do not have 
information on what UK respondents in our sample voted for in the referendum, let alone whether 
they voted at all. To the extent that those who do vote are considered to be rational utility maximisers, 
information on their actual vote could allow us to more formally test the connection between decision/
preference and experienced utility in this setting.
These inferences are instead drawn based on a general attitude individuals in our sample hold 
towards the EU; and although being rather unlikely, say, for a UK individual with a positive image of 
the EU having a preference for Brexit (Macdougall et al., 2020), we cannot strictly exclude the reverse 
case for individuals with a generally negative image. To illustrate, consider the case of a UK individ-
ual with a strongly negative EU image: this may stem from a dissatisfaction with certain EU policies, 
but not necessarily with a preference for Brexit per se. In other words, a negative EU image might be 
capturing a view for a ‘different Europe’, not ‘less Europe’ (Hobolt & Brouard, 2011). This argument 
might indeed, partly, justify why our regression results estimate a significant decrease in subjective 
well- being for those with a positive EU image (i.e. offering evidence of preference and experience 
utility coinciding), and an overall lack of increased subjective well- being for those with a negative EU 
image despite the United Kingdom now ‘taking back control’. One should, however, weigh this lim-
itation of observing specific preferences towards Brexit against the possibility of individuals feeling 
reluctant to state their sentiments in a Brexit- specific question; not least, to avoid being labelled as a 
‘Brexiter’ or a ‘Remainer’ given the polarised sentiment around the time of the referendum.
Finally, expectations of own finances/the economy are certainly not fully or adequately explor-
ing the mechanisms between the Brexit vote and subjective well- being. The descriptive evidence 
presented here is only suggestive of such; an investigation of a more comprehensive list of beliefs as 
plausible channels could be the focus of future research.
Notwithstanding these issues, this study offers robust evidence of an overall decrease in subjec-
tive well- being for individuals in the United Kingdom during the Brexit transition period. With the 
arguably devastating implications of the Coronavirus 2019 pandemic (COVID- 19) on peoples’ lives 
and the economy— affecting countries within the European continent in the early months of 2020, 
thus overlapping with the UK’s official departure from the EU in January 2020— a study focusing on 
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APPENDIX 
T A B L E  A 1  Adaptation— Heterogeneous effects
OLS Ologit
(1) (2)
UK very positive × Autumn 2016 −0.047 (0.044) −0.186 (0.169)
UK very positive × Spring 2017 −0.143*** (0.041) −0.565*** (0.151)
UK very positive × Autumn 2017 −0.071 (0.04) −0.283** (0.142)
UK very positive × Spring 2018 −0.158*** (0.047) −0.518***(0.169)
UK very positive × Autumn 2018 −0.109** (0.045) −0.394** (0.154)
UK very positive × Spring 2019 −0.073 (0.043) −0.326** (0.142)
UK positive × Autumn 2016 −0.022 (0.034) −0.091 (0.12)
UK positive × Spring 2017 −0.037 (0.024) −0.116 (0.069)
UK positive × Autumn 2017 −0.048 (0.033) −0.157 (0.09)
UK positive × Spring 2018 −0.137*** (0.04) −0.431*** (0.121)
UK positive × Autumn 2018 −0.154*** (0.031) −0.53*** (0.102)
UK positive × Spring 2019 −0.132*** (0.032) −0.457*** (0.085)
UK neutral × Autumn 2016 −0.019 (0.036) −0.06 (0.096)
UK neutral × Spring 2017 −0.091*** (0.031) −0.288*** (0.09)
UK neutral × Autumn 2017 −0.036 (0.032) −0.116 (0.103)
UK neutral × Spring 2018 −0.118*** (0.041) −0.402*** (0.137)
UK neutral × Autumn 2018 −0.115*** (0.03) −0.401*** (0.094)
UK neutral × Spring 2019 −0.108*** (0.033) −0.339*** (0.094)
UK negative × Autumn 2016 −0.008 (0.049) −0.023 (0.152)
UK negative × Spring 2017 −0.018 (0.029) −0.032 (0.102)
UK negative × Autumn 2017 −0.062** (0.029) −0.156 (0.095)
UK negative × Spring 2018 −0.007 (0.048) 0.013 (0.159)
UK negative × Autumn 2018 −0.055 (0.035) −0.171 (0.112)
UK negative × Spring 2019 −0.029 (0.033) −0.117 (0.098)
UK very negative × Autumn 2016 0.047 (0.06) 0.086 (0.192)
UK very negative × Spring 2017 −0.013 (0.109) −0.115 (0.353)
UK very negative × Autumn 2017 −0.032 (0.057) −0.154 (0.181)
UK very negative × Spring 2018 −0.054 (0.074) −0.202 (0.252)
UK very negative × Autumn 2018 −0.095** (0.042) −0.321** (0.132)
UK very negative × Spring 2019 0.026 (0.044) 0.038 (0.134)
Individual characteristics Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
Month/year FE Yes Yes
(pseudo) R2 0.273 0.138
N 184,354 184,354
Notes: Regression is OLS (by combining Equations (2) and (3)). Column 2 is the equivalent ordered logit model. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the country- wave level reported in parentheses. Roots of interaction terms are included in the regressions, but not 
reported for brevity.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05.
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T A B L E  A 2  Brexit vote and ‘EU image’
OLS Ologit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UK × Post Brexit 0.007 0.006 0.018 0.017
(0.029) (0.029) (0.059) (0.059)
UK −0.313*** −0.279*** −0.566*** −0.522***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.055) (0.057)
Post Brexit 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.202*** 0.205***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.06) (0.061)
Individual characteristics No Yes No Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
(pseudo) R2 0.076 0.113 0.027 0.042
N 194,607 190,233 194,607 190,233
Notes: Regressions in columns 1– 2 are OLS based on Equation (1) with the dependent variable being ‘EU image’, without and with 
individual characteristics; columns 3– 4 are the equivalent ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the country- 
wave level reported in parentheses.
***p<0.01
